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Abstract 
 
In May 1991, writing in the op-ed column of the New York Times, the US Senator for 
New York, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, called for the Central Intelligence Agency to be 
disbanded. Arguing that the CIA represented an historical anachronism that had 
outlived its usefulness to American foreign policymakers, Moynihan proposed that 
the Agency should be stripped of its autonomy and have its intelligence functions 
subsumed by the Department of State. Moynihan’s rhetorical assault on the CIA 
marked the opening salvo in a protracted campaign that, over the following decade, 
until his death, in March 2003, would see the one-time member of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, lobby relentlessly for reform of America’s intelligence 
community and against pervasive official secrecy. To date, Moynihan’s evangelical 
fervour in championing a more open intelligence paradigm, which came to 
incorporate the drafting of congressional bills, the chairmanship of a bi-partisan 
commission on government secrecy, the publication of a book, and innumerable 
speeches and articles, has been interpreted in a narrow personal and political context. 
Commentators have tended to characterise Moynihan’s turn against the CIA, and 
toward government transparency, as symptomatic of individual eccentricity, 
disenchantment with purported Agency excesses during the Reagan administration, 
and ill-judged post-Cold War hubris. This article breaks new ground by reframing and 
reperiodising Moynihan’s relationship with intelligence. It suggests that Moynihan’s 
attitudes to intelligence and state secrecy were formulated much earlier than has 
hitherto been acknowledged, and in an environment far removed from Washington’s 
corridors of power. Specifically, the essay relocates Moynihan’s emergence as an 
advocate of intelligence reform in the global political turmoil of the early 1970s 
when, as Richard Nixon’s Ambassador to India, he was afforded ample scope to 
assess the CIA’s utility as an instrument of American diplomacy.  
 
 
 
 
The morning of 6 August 1974 did not begin well for Daniel Patrick Moynihan. 
Sitting at his desk in New Delhi’s Roosevelt House, the official residence of the US 
ambassador to India, Moynihan was assailed by nagging doubts that his posting to the 
subcontinent would be judged as a failure. Moynihan had enjoyed a modicum of 
success in India. Most notably, he had eradicated a significant and long-running 
source of Indo-US friction by engineering an agreement to write-off a $3.3 billion 
debt the Indian government had accumulated purchasing American food grains over 
the previous decade. Congratulating Moynihan on this achievement, one former 
ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, observed in admiration that, ‘I wrestled with 
this [debt problem] for six years and was never able to solve it.’1 On that steamy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Chester Bowles to Moynihan, 8 Oct. 1973, Box I-351, Correspondence File, Papers of Daniel P. 
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Indian summer morning, however, Moynihan’s mood darkened with the appearance 
of an aide carrying reports on the latest incident, in what had proved a seemingly 
endless series of problems, involving CIA operations in India. On this occasion, the 
ambassador was informed that local security service officers had arrested several 
Indian nationals for passing information to CIA officers, and were demanding the 
expulsion of three American embassy staff associated with the affair. ‘What may I ask 
is a man to do with the rest of a day that begins in such a manner?,’ an exasperated 
Moynihan confided later in his diary.2 The answer, it transpired, was to draft a long 
letter to Washington, in which the ambassador urged US secretary of state, Henry 
Kissinger, to: 
 
...pull the C.I.A. out of India. It is a devastating liability while it remains…. 
Unquestionably we would get better and cheaper information. The alternative is to 
remain on the front page of the Indian press for yet another decade, with a quarter 
of the charges true and three quarters believed to be true by the most sophisticated 
and best informed people in government.3 
 
Moynihan’s tenure as Richard Nixon’s ambassador to India, between 1973 and 
1975, has received scant scholarly attention. Accounts of Moynihan’s long career in 
public service have focused overwhelmingly on the periods before, and after, his tour 
of the subcontinent. Works such as Godfrey Hodgson’s The Gentleman from New 
York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan – A Biography (2000) privilege Moynihan’s domestic 
accomplishments and dismiss his foreign service as a political and intellectual 
interregnum. Likewise, Steven Weisman’s edited collection of Moynihan’s diaries 
and correspondence, Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Portrait of Letters of an American 
Visionary (2010), marginalizes his time in India, and underplays its significance in 
recalibrating Moynihan’s thinking on America’s international relations. Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan: The Intellectual in Public Life (1998), a study of essays edited by 
Robert Katzmann, offers little insight into the two years that Moynihan spent in New 
Delhi. Gil Troy’s recent publication, Moynihan’s Moment: America’s Fight Against 
Zionism as Racism (2013), is a welcome addition to the literature on Moynihan, but is 
directed exclusively at his post-Indian appointment as US ambassador to the United 
Nations. Some important investigations have been conducted, therefore, in tracing the 
evolution of Moynihan’s eclectic life and work from its origins in poverty stricken 
Oklahoma, via Manhattan’s pre-war Hell’s Kitchen ghetto, Ivy League academia, 
service in four successive presidential administrations, from John F. Kennedy to 
Gerald Ford, and culmination in the US Senate. Yet, Moynihan’s ambassadorial 
posting to India and, more pertinently, its influence on shaping his pronouncements 
on intelligence agencies and state secrecy, that first came to public prominence after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, remains an historiographical lacuna in need of attention.4  
This article will examine the process by which Moynihan came to develop a deep 
suspicion and mistrust of much of the work undertaken by the CIA, well before his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Moynihan, Library of Congress, Washington DC [hereafter DMP]. 
2 Steven R. Weisman (ed.), Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Portrait in Letters of an American Visionary 
(New York, 2010), diary entry 6 Aug. 1974, p. 346. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See, Godfrey Hodgson, The Gentleman from New York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan – A Biography 
(New York, 2000); Weisman, A Portrait in Letters; Robert Katzmann (ed.), Daniel Patrick Moynihan: 
The Intellectual in Public Life (Washington D.C., 1998); and, Gil Troy, Moynihan’s Moment: 
America’s Fight Against Zionism as Racism (New York 2013). 
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elevation to the Senate and post-Cold War critiques of the Agency, and it will 
consider how his relationship with intelligence and secrecy evolved during his time in 
India. It will assess the rise of anti-American sentiment in the developing world in the 
early 1970s, habitually channeled through attacks on a purportedly subversive and 
anti-democratic CIA, and its impact on Moynihan. This article will also consider the 
extent to which the CIA’s emergence in India as a potent symbol of American 
malevolence and amorality compromised wider Indo-US relations. Lastly, this article 
will engage with the question of how to account for Moynihan’s transformation from 
virulent anti-Soviet spokesperson into Cold War sceptic and prominent advocate of 
intelligence reform and government transparency.  
At the beginning of his political career, Moynihan’s willingness to speak out in 
support of the poorest sections of US society and sympathy with the African 
American struggle for civil rights, saw him labeled a liberal. Yet, over time 
Moynihan’s reputation as a progressive dimmed considerably. At ease with his 
working class roots, the self-made Moynihan courted controversy, refusing to shy 
away from criticizing what he saw as the failings of communities mired in poverty. 
Relations with social activists were further strained by questions Moynihan posed 
over the cohesion of the Black American family. In 1965, Moynihan provoked 
outrage by suggesting, in a report entitled ‘The Negro Family: The Case for National 
Action,’ that a culture of welfare dependency, illegitimate births, and broken homes, 
acted as a break on Black equality. Five years later, his relations with civil rights 
campaigners reached a nadir following the New York Times’ publication of a note in 
which Moynihan urged the federal government to adopt a policy ‘benign neglect’ on 
issues of race, and instead focus its energies on job creation and economic recovery.5 
By the early 1970s, Moynihan had shifted sufficiently to the right to feel comfortable 
serving in the administration of Richard Nixon.  
Indeed, as the Cold War fizzled out in the late 1980s, and public support for the 
CIA and its triumphalist rhetoric came to represent an article of political faith within 
conservative circles, Moynihan might have been expected to conform to type. Instead, 
the implosion of the Eastern bloc witnessed Moynihan assail the CIA as incompetent, 
dishonest and Machiavellian. In Moynihan’s view, the Agency had willfully inflated 
the Soviet threat to the United States; promoted a self-serving military-industrial 
paradigm injurious to American prosperity; and flouted the Constitution. Moreover, 
the CIA had fostered an opaque national security culture predicated on excessive and 
expensive layers of secrecy. In short, Moynihan argued, the CIA had ceased to serve 
America’s national interest, and should be disbanded.  
Moynihan’s assault on the CIA marked the opening salvo in a protracted campaign 
that, over the following decade, until his death, in March 2003, would see the one-
time member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, lobby relentlessly for 
reform within America’s intelligence community and against pervasive official 
secrecy. To date, Moynihan’s evangelical fervour in championing a more open 
intelligence bureaucracy, which came to incorporate the drafting of Congressional 
bill; the chairmanship of a bi-partisan commission on government secrecy; the 
publication of a book; and innumerable speeches and articles; has been interpreted in 
a narrow personal and political context. This article breaks new ground by reframing 
and reperiodising Moynihan’s relationship with intelligence. It suggests that 
Moynihan’s attitudes to intelligence and state secrecy were formulated much earlier 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Daniel Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); 
Hodgson, Gentleman from New York, p. 13. 
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than has hitherto been acknowledged, and in an environment far removed from 
Washington’s corridors of power. In January 1974, from his vantage point in India, 
Moynihan observed privately that, ‘CIA is not dead, but dying, I should think… Too 
much white shoe fun in an unfunny world.’6 To fully understand the genesis of 
Moynihan’s emergence as an advocate of intelligence reform, it is necessary to travel 
back to the global political turmoil of the early 1970s when, as Nixon’s ambassador to 
India, the future Senator for New York was afforded ample opportunity to gauge the 
CIA’s utility as an instrument of American diplomacy.  
 
 
I 
 
In many respects, Richard Nixon’s decision to appoint Moynihan as his ambassador 
to India in 1973 was surprising. Moynihan had carved out a career in public service 
on the back of a reputation forged in domestic policymaking, focusing on issues of 
unemployment, inner city deprivation and race relations7 Moynihan had no previous 
diplomatic experience or expertise in international relations. Having served in 
Nixon’s first presidential administration earlier in the decade, in charge of a portfolio 
that encompassed civil rights, social welfare and environmental issues, Moynihan had 
earned a measure of the president’s respect. Admired for his intellectual range, 
inquisitive mind and political astuteness, Moynihan embraced difficult challenges 
with alacrity. In the context of America’s foreign relations, no challenge loomed 
larger than India. 
At the time, Washington’s relationship with New Delhi was under severe pressure. 
In 1971, Nixon had infuriated India’s premier, Indira Gandhi, by ‘tilting’ decisively 
toward Pakistan following the outbreak of Indo–Pakistani hostilities. In turn, having 
thwarted US attempts to prevent East Pakistan’s transformation into the independent 
state of Bangladesh, Gandhi’s animus in full measure. 8 In the aftermath of what came 
to be characterized at the ‘South Asia crisis,’ an atmosphere of deep mutual mistrust 
pervaded American relations with India. Indo–U.S. animosity was further aggravated 
by differences over issues as diverse as the Gandhi government’s burgeoning ties to 
Moscow; Indian opposition to the war in Vietnam; and, New Delhi’s fledgling nuclear 
weapons program. Within the confines of Nixon’s Oval Office, Indians were labeled 
as ‘bastards,’ while Gandhi herself was excoriated as an ‘old witch’ and a ‘bitch.’ 9 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Weisman, A Portrait in Letters, diary entry 7 Jan. 1974, pp. 323-4. 7	  Prominent publications by Moynihan in the domestic policymaking arena include: Beyond the 
Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City (Boston, 1963); 
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (Washington D.C., 1965); Maximum Feasible 
Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty (New York, 1971); and, The Politics of a 
Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan (New York, 1973).  
8  Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York, 1978), pp. 526–31. For an 
assessment of Indo–U.S. relations under Nixon, see, in particular, R. J. McMahon, “The Danger of 
Geopolitical Fantasies: Nixon, Kissinger, and the South Asia Crisis of 1971,” in Nixon and the World: 
American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, eds. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford, 2008); 
Sanjit Gandhi, “The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971,” National Security Archive 
Electronic Briefing Book No. 79, 16 Dec. 2002 [accessed 10 Nov. 2014 at 
<http://www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/>]; and, Dennis Kux, India and the United 
States: Estranged Democracies (Washington, DC, 1993).  
9 See, for example, Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Washington, 26 May 1971, and 
Conversation Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, Washington, 5 Nov., 1971, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969–1976, Vol. E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–72, Documents 135 and 150 
[accessed on 10 Nov. 2014 at <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1969-76ve07>]. See 
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Intriguingly, Moynihan had anticipated that Nixon would turn to him when, during 
the President’s second term, the White House sought to normalize its relationship 
with India. In 1972, in conversation with his wife Liz, and against the backdrop of 
George McGovern’s nomination as the Democrat’s presidential candidate, Moynihan 
forecast that, ‘Nixon will win [reelection] and he’ll ask me to go to India.’10 Political 
commentators applauded Nixon’s decision as an unconventional but inspired choice. 
Writing in the New York Times, Tom Wicker observed mischievously that, ‘…sending 
this imaginative and energetic Irishman as ambassador to India may be the best idea 
president Nixon has had; Mrs. Gandhi had best look to he neutralism and her wine 
cellar.’11 In contrast, Moynihan’s friends and colleagues were unsure whether his 
appointment merited celebration or commiseration. In a letter sent to Moynihan in 
December 1972, Theodore Barreaux, deputy director of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, noted simply, ‘India? Well, congratulations anyway.’ 12  In the 
subcontinent, Moynihan’s arrival was eagerly anticipated. The influential, Times of 
India, predicted that Moynihan would carry, ‘the process of thawing Indo-American 
relations one step further. As a leading liberal intellectual, first associated with the 
Kennedy administration, he should find no difficulty in making friends in New 
Delhi.’13 Columnists in The Indian Express concurred. ‘It would be a fair presumption 
that president Nixon would not have appointed Mr Moynihan,’ the Express 
concluded, ‘if he was not desirous of restoring some of the old warmth in the relations 
between the two countries.’14 
Some Indians evidenced less enthusiasm for Moynihan. The left-leaning Indian 
daily, Blitz, pronounced scathingly that ‘Tricky Dick’ Nixon could, ‘not have chosen 
a trickier person…as US Ambassador to India.’ Disparaging Moynihan’s credentials 
as a liberal scholar in sympathy with India, the Indian newspaper labelled the 
ambassador designate as, ‘a double-thinking, double-talking and double-crossing 
politician has no place in socialist, non-aligned India…’15 Such expressions of 
hostility were emblematic of a wider and growing disaffection with the United States 
that swept across the developing world in the early 1970s. To many Indians, the 
global deployment of preponderant post-war American power had long seemed 
redolent of a hidden neo-imperialist U.S. foreign policy. More specifically, the CIA, 
in its capacity as the covert foreign policy tool of choice for US presidents, came to 
acquire a uniquely invidious international reputation as an antidemocratic socio-
political malefactor. In India, as elsewhere inside the global South, symbolism 
attached to the CIA came to overshadow American diplomatic initiatives designed to 
win ‘hearts and minds.’ Trust and confidence in U.S. domestic institutions, and 
amongst America’s international partners, was corroded by a climate of conspiracy 
surrounding the CIA which, in turn, fostered a political culture in the subcontinent 
that at times verged on paranoia.  
Indeed, the harsh media spotlight cast upon some of the CIA’s more questionable 
activities in 1967, following the public disclosure of Agency improprieties in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
also Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston, 1979), p. 848. 
10 Bernard Weinraub, ‘Daniel Moynihan’s Passage to India,’ The New York Times Magazine, 31 Mar. 
1974. 
11 Tom Wicker, ‘Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire,’ New York Times News Service, 1972, Box I-352, 
Folder India Correspondence B7 1973-1975, DPM. 
12 Barreaux to Moynihan, 13 Dec. 1972, Box I-352, Folder India Correspondence Congratulatory 2, 
DPM. 
13 ‘Current Topics’, The Times of India, 12 Dec. 1972. 
14 ‘A New Ambassador’, The Indian Express, 18 Dec. 1972. 
15 ‘Tricky Dick’s Ayaram!’Blitz, 6 Jan. 1973. 
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American magazine, Ramparts, was to have a profound and enduring impact upon 
Indian perceptions of the US government and its external intelligence service. In the 
wake of the Ramparts disclosures, which centred on covert Agency support for 
international educational institutions and cultural bodies, the CIA came to occupy a 
prominent place in mainstream Indo–U.S. cultural and political discourse. The blanket 
exposure given by the world’s press to CIA indiscretions, exemplified by the 
international media circus that developed around subsequent Congressional probes 
into the US intelligence community, made a deep psychological impression in the 
subcontinent. India’s journalists and politicians were captivated when, having 
publicly catalogued the CIA’s involvement in a series of plots to assassinate national 
leaders and subvert foreign governments, the chairman of one influential investigative 
committee, the Democratic senator from Idaho, Frank Church, famously characterized 
the Agency’s behavior as akin to, ‘a rogue elephant on a rampage.’16 
Moynihan’s immediate predecessor in New Delhi, Kenneth Keating, had afforded 
some sense of the magnitude of the diplomatic task that the new ambassador faced in 
recalibrating relations between two nations that, in the words of one contemporary 
observer, had become ‘locked in a corrosive limbo.’17 Six months before Moynihan’s 
arrival in the subcontinent, the bitterness that Indira Gandhi’s government retained for 
the United States had come to the fore when Keating made a farewell call on the 
Indian premier, prior to returning home to oversee Nixon’s reelection campaign. 
Keating had suspected that his interview with Gandhi would prove awkward. During 
a thirty-minute audience with the Indian leader, the ambassador was, nonetheless, left 
stunned by his host’s ‘emotional and distorted’ assault on the Nixon administration, 
and the purportedly nefarious operations of the CIA. ‘Everything the U.S. does,’ a 
rattled Keating was informed by Gandhi, ‘is against India.’ Forces inside the 
American government, she assured the incredulous ambassador, were ‘working 
against us in India’; ‘cooperating with communist extremists’ to destabilize her 
administration; and encouraging ‘a lot of American professors . . . to engage in 
improper activities injurious to India.’ The latter charge, given Moynihan’s deep 
scholarly roots, appeared particularly unfortunate. Keating’s insistence that the $10 
billion of aid which the United States had allocated to India in the past could hardly 
be considered ‘anti- Indian,’ was dismissed by Gandhi in a ‘manner [that] was 
arrogantly confident, ready to believe the worst about the U.S., closed to any 
explanation, and thoroughly obnoxious.’ ‘Incredible!,’ the dumbstruck Keating cabled 
back to Washington, ‘My successor has an even tougher task ahead than I 
anticipated.’18  
It was with some trepidation and a sense of foreboding therefore, that Moynihan 
descended from the steps of a Pan Am jumbo jet at New Delhi airport just before 
dawn, on 20 February 1973, to take up his post as ambassador to India. 
Inauspiciously, Moynihan’s journey had been interrupted en route when a diplomatic 
spat erupted between the state department and India’s ministry of external affairs, 
leaving the ambassador designate kicking his heels in Rome. To Washington’s ire, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Frank Church, 25 Sept. 1975, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect 
to Intelligence Activities, Washington, D.C. [accessed 10 Nov. 2014 at < http:// 
www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/vol2/pdf/ChurchV2_3_Brennan.pdf >]. 
17 Bernard Weinraub, ‘Daniel Moynihan’s Passage to India,’ The New York Times Magazine, 31 Mar. 
1974. 
18  Keating to Secretary of State, No. 9257, ‘Farewell Call on Prime Minister: Indo-American 
Relations,’ 25 Jul. 1972, Box 28, Folder Gandhi, Prime Minister Indira, Miscellaneous Cables, RG 84, 
Ambassador Keating Subject Files, 1968–1972, National Archives, College Park, Maryland [hereafter 
NA]. 
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a speech delivered to the One-Asia Assembly, Indira Gandhi had assigned a racial 
dimension to America’s bombing campaign in North Vietnam. In the circumstances, 
Nixon was disinclined to have Moynihan photographed shaking hands with India’s 
premier. ‘Will Moynihan come at all?’ ran the headline on the front page of The 
Indian Express.19 Barely a year later, having failed to improve Indo-US relations in 
the face of repeated Indian accusations of CIA impropriety, an uncharacteristically 
‘subdued and broadly disillusioned’ Moynihan was left to ponder whether, in 
response to the Indian Express’ question, his answer ought to have been, ‘No.’20 
 
II 
 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan was to characterise the troubled twenty-three months that he 
spent as US ambassador in New Delhi as ‘the plague years.’ From the outset, 
Moynihan resolved to adopt a much lower public profile in India than some his 
illustrious predecessors, such as the Harvard economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, and 
the congressman and former advertising executive from Connecticut, Chester 
Bowles.21 In part, Moynihan’s determination to work, as far as possible, in the 
political shadows and away from the harsh glare of the media, reflected his conviction 
that an ambassador should implement policy rather than make it. Emphasising his 
willingness to faithfully toe Washington’s line, whatever that might be, Moynihan 
noted in a letter to Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser, that, ‘my fixed 
principle...has been to convey what I have thought policy was, and not what I might 
have wished it were.’22 Having completed over a year in post, Moynihan boasted that 
he had delivered only one set speech in India and made a grand total of three public 
appearances. ‘I have tried to keep my head down out of a conviction that we have 
previously been far too much in evidence and are still thought, by Indians, to be 
omnipresent,’ the ambassador explained to a friend.23 ‘We are not here to tell them 
how to run India,’ Moynihan subsequently reflected, ‘That is all over.’24  
Equally, Moynihan appreciated that the failure of the United States to cultivate 
harmonious and productive relations with India had, ‘been a central feature of Asian 
politics for a quarter century, and by 1972 things had got about as bad as they could 
get.’25 In the circumstances, an approach based on quiet diplomacy appeared likely to 
prove a more profitable means of burying political hatchets and placing bi-lateral 
relations on a more positive footing. Moynihan’s circumspection drew plaudits in 
India. In April 1973, writing in The Hindu, the prominent Indian journalist, G.K. 
Reddy, express satisfaction that, ‘for the first time in recent years, there is an 
American ambassador in New Delhi who knows his mind, the limitations of his 
brief...and the pitfalls of attempting to do too much in too short a time.”’26  
Above all, however, Moynihan was acutely conscious of the toxic psychological 
prism of suspicion, fear and loathing through which many Indians had come to view 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 ‘Will Moynihan come at all?’ The Indian Express, 9 Feb. 1973.  
20 Bernard Weinraub, ‘Daniel Moynihan’s Passage to India,’ The New York Times Magazine, 31 Mar. 
1974. 
21 Draft Manuscript for ‘A Dangerous Place’, I-350 Speeches and Writings File Folder A, DPM; Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous Place (Boston, 1978), p. 16. 
22 Moynihan to Kissinger, 22 Nov. 1973, Box 370, DPM. 
23 Moynihan to Professor Lockwood, 29 Jul. 1974, Box 361, DPM. 
24 Moynihan notes, 20 Feb. 1974, Box 361, DPM. 
25 Moynihan to Davis, 19 Jun. 1974, Box 361, DPM. 
26 G. K. Reddy, ‘United States, India and Moynihan,’ The Hindu, 18 Apr. 1973.  
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the CIA. The noisy and intrinsically insecure covert operations mounted by the 
Agency across the developing world after 1947, which from the late 1960s had been 
the subject of headline stories in the mainstream international media, left their mark in 
India. On arrival, Moynihan echoed the sentiments articulated Keating, informing 
Kissinger that, ‘the paranoia out here is thicker than the dust.’ ‘Stop sending India 
poisoned wheat,’ Moynihan quipped to Kissinger, ‘the Prime Minister is on to you.’27 
After three months in New Delhi, Moynihan was happy enough to be ‘getting on very 
well’ with the Indian officials. The ambassador’s one concern was a, ‘tremendous 
campaign mounting on the subject of U.S. spies.’ The local press, Moynihan griped, 
appeared set on ‘fingering one man after another’ as a CIA agent. Some Indian 
government officers had ‘gone along’ with the espionage game, and ‘informally’ 
accused a member of the US consulate, in the eastern Indian city of Calcutta, of 
spying. Bridling at charges levelled against Americans who had ‘done nothing,’ 
Moynihan informed Indian officials that they were free to call for the expulsion of 
diplomats, ‘but they should understand that I will be going home on the same 
plane.’28 
On a personal level, Moynihan had no axe to grind with the CIA. The ambassador 
liked and respected the Agency’s station chief in New Delhi, a Dryden scholar and 
fellow academic from Cornell. Yet, in practical terms, Moynihan found the CIA to be 
less than useful. Specifically, the Agency’s officers in India appeared intellectually 
hidebound and ineffective. ‘[I]n a year of trying to get them [CIA] to think about 
Indian Communism for me, they have not been able to do so,’ he complained. 
Furthermore, in a wider regional context, Moynihan lamented that the CIA’s public 
profile and operational ineptitude had come to represent serious and growing 
impediments to US diplomacy. In January 1974, the ambassador observed that:   
 
They [CIA] have just mercilessly fouled up in Thailand: with a student government 
which had denounced the new American ambassador as a CIA agent before he 
even arrived last month, some clown dreams up a letter to the Prime Minister 
offering a cease fire from the Communist insurgents in the North … Alas, the 
illiterate youth who was given the letter to mail registered it with the home address 
of the agent who had given it to him. Result, black wreaths hung on the Embassy 
gates, apologies, silences…29 
 
 
Later that year, Moynihan was taken aback when Indian government officials 
issued further public demands for the expulsion of U.S. embassy personnel on charges 
of espionage and, at the same time, privately requested closer Indo–U.S. intelligence 
liaison. The head of the Indian prime minister’s secretariat, Prithvi Nath Dhar, and the 
chief of India’s external intelligence service, R. N. Kao, quietly approached 
Moynihan to inquire whether CIA director, William Colby, would consider visiting 
India. ‘The two [intelligence] services had worked together so well, and on so many 
important matters, Rao assured Moynihan. ‘The training Indians had received in the 
United States was of such quality. The Director of C.I.A. would be so welcome.’ 
Following his encounter with Rao and Dhar, a bemused Moynihan was left 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Moynihan to Kissinger, 10 Mar. 1973, Box I-377 Folder India Subject File White House 1973, 
DPM.  
28 Moynihan to Galbraith, 10 May 1973, Box I-377 Folder India Subject File Soviet Union 1973-74, 
DPM.  29	  Steven R. Weisman, A Portrait in Letters, diary entry 7 Jan. 1974, pp. 323-3. 
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pondering, ‘What is one to do?’ Having earlier pressed the State Department to pull 
the CIA out of India altogether in an effort to keep the Agency off the front pages of 
India’s newspapers, following his meeting with Dhar and Kao, Moynihan rescinded 
the request. ‘They [the Indian government] want us,’ the ambassador wrote to 
Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to Henry Kissinger, now US Secretary of 
State. ‘Possibly they want even more of us.’30 
After shaking off British colonial rule in August 1947, successive Indian 
governments exhibited few qualms about surreptitiously cooperating with foreign 
intelligence agencies, including those of the United States, when it suited their 
interests to do so.31 Such collaboration occurred amidst a climate of rising popular 
antipathy for CIA in India, which increased markedly in the wake of the Watergate 
scandal and the publication of salacious exposes by Agency employees detailing 
Langley’s historic misdeeds.32 In part, Indira Gandhi undoubtedly calculated that the 
Agency could serve as a convenient external scapegoat for India’s internal troubles 
and, at the same time, provide a means of placating left-wing political allies with a 
show of anti-Western bluster. 33  Nonetheless, for all the political opportunism 
evidenced by Indian politicians, a series of events linked to the Nixon administration, 
and America’s intelligence services more particularly, unquestionably exacerbated 
feelings of fear and anxiety that the CIA engendered in many Indians, and in Indira 
Gandhi, above all. 
Most obviously, the Indian leader was affected by the CIA’s complicity in the 
bloody rightwing coup in Chile, in September 1973, which removed the socialist 
government of Salvador Allende. Following Allende’s demise, Gandhi was genuinely 
concerned that she would be the next target on Nixon’s list for regime change.34 
Figures inside Gandhi’s Congress party declared defiantly that the turmoil in South 
America would not be repeated in the subcontinent. The Indian government ‘would 
not allow Delhi to be turned into Chile.’ 35 In an interview reproduced in the Congress 
newssheet, Socialist Weekly, Gandhi laid bare her personal anxieties in relation to the 
CIA, asking pointedly, ‘Have these several Western countries not given full moral 
and material support to the most authoritarian regimes of Africa and Asia? Have we 
so soon forgotten what happened to Chile?’36 In an ill-judged bid to convince the 
Indian premier that the Nixon administration wished her no harm, the American 
deputy chief of mission in New Delhi called on Gandhi to reassure her, ‘that of course 
the US had not’ meddled in Chilean domestic politics.37  
Gandhi later witnessed the CIA’s director, William Colby, testified before a US 
congressional committee that, between 1970 and 1973, the Agency had, in fact, spent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Weisman, A Portrait in Letters, diary entries 6 Aug. and 5 Sep. 1974, pp. 346 and 351–52. 
31 See, for example, Paul Michael McGarr, ‘“Quiet Americans in India”: The CIA and the Politics of 
Intelligence in Cold War South Asia,’ Diplomatic History, Vol. 38, No. 5 (2014), pp. 1046-1082. 
32 Notably, Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (London, 1974), 
and, Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (London: Penguin, 1975). 
33 Moynihan to Secretary of State, No. 03617, 16 Mar. 1974, CFP, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/ 1974-
12/31/1974, RG 59, NA.  
34 Gandhi’s biographers have made much of the “Chilean’ effect on the Indian premier. See P. N. Dhar, 
Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency” and Indian Democracy (New Delhi, 2000); Katherine Frank, Indira: 
The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (London, 2002); and, Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi: A Personal and 
Political Biography (London, 1989). 
35 Schneider (Embassy New Delhi) to Secretary of State, No. 07903, 16 Jun. 1975, CFP, Electronic 
Telegrams, 1/1/1975-12/31/1975, RG 59, NA. 
36 Socialist Weekly, 15 Aug. 1975. 37	  Moynihan to Secretary of State, No. 12063, 10 Sept. 1974, CFP, Electronic Telegrams 1/1/1974-
12/31/1974, RG 59, NA.	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more than $8 million in an effort to destabilize the Allende government.38 Following 
Colby’s testimony, a disconsolate Moynihan complained that, by handling the Chile 
question in such an inept manner, Washington had done a first rate job of shooting 
itself in the foot. On 10 September 1974, Moynihan grumbled to Kissinger that 
Gandhi was now certain:  
 
that we would be content to see her overthrown, as we have, to her mind, been 
content to see others like her overthrown. She knows full well that we have done 
our share and more of bloody and dishonourable deeds. This as such is not her 
concern. She knows all too much of such matters. It is precisely because she is not 
innocent, not squeamish, and not a moralizer that her concern about American 
intentions is real and immediate. And of course the news from the United States, as 
printed in the Indian press, repeatedly confirms her worst suspicions and genuine 
fears.39  
 
Moynihan’s gloom deepened when the investigative journalist, Seymour Hersh, 
obtained a copy of his message to Kissinger, and printed the ambassador’s 
observations on Gandhi on the front page of the New York Times.40 Worse still, to 
Moynihan’s ire, Colby compounded Gandhi’s anxiety that the CIA was out to get her 
by launching into a spirited public defense of the United States’ rationale for 
undertaking covert actions. On 13 September, in an address to the Fund for Peace 
Conference, having confirmed the Agency’s record of ‘assist[ing] America’s friends 
against her adversaries in their contest for control of a foreign nation’s political 
direction,’ the Colby proceeded to argue that:  
 
a sovereign nation must look ahead to changing circumstances. I can envisage 
situations in which the United States might well need to conduct covert action in 
the face of some new threat that developed in the world . . . I thus would think it 
mistaken to deprive our nation of the possibility of some moderate covert action 
response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic 
protest and sending the Marines.41  
 
On 2 December, Colby underlined his views on covert actions in an interview 
published by US News & World Report. After being replayed in the Indian press, the 
interview had the effect, in Moynihan’s words, of whipping up a ‘wholly predictable 
storm’ in the subcontinent. ‘No one [should] have any illusions as to how bad it has 
been,’ Moynihan cabled back to Washington, ‘or that it [the CIA issue] will go away.’ 
The irate ambassador was left ‘groping’ for an answer as to why Colby had 
considered it wise to publicly debate the merits and morals of CIA clandestine 
operations. The KGB, Moynihan noted ruefully, felt no compulsion to air its dirty 
intelligence linen in public. On 3 December, in a bitter cable to Kissinger, Moynihan 
asked candidly, ‘It is out of the question that some thought might be given in 
Washington to the effect in India of statements such as the Director has made? It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See, The Patriot and The Times of India, 9 Sep. 1974. 
39 Moynihan to Secretary of State, No. 12063, 10 Sep. 1974, CFP, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974-
12/31/1974, RG 59, NA.  
40 ‘Concern by India on C.I.A. Related,’ The New York Times, 13 Sep. 13, 1974. 
41 William E. Colby, ‘The View from Langley,’ Address to the Fund for Peace Conference on “The 
CIA and Covert Actions,” 13 Sep 1974, Box I: 371, Folder India: Central Intelligence Agency Folder, 
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that nobody knows? Or is it that nobody cares?’42 In his private journal, Moynihan 
added that Colby had behaved ‘incredibly’ and ‘criminally’ in talking out of turn to 
journalists. ‘What can he [Colby] think he is doing,’ Moynihan raged, ‘Is there 
nothing to which bureaucracy will not lead a man.’43  
During a visit to the subcontinent in October, Kissinger had, Moynihan reminded 
the secretary of state, personally assured Gandhi that the Nixon government was not 
‘directly or indirectly’ attempting to destabilize India. At the time, Kissinger made 
much of the fact that, as chairman of the committee that authorized American covert 
intelligence operations, he could state unequivocally that no such activity had been 
taken in relation to India. 44 ‘In what but an insane situation could a Director of 
Central Intelligence,’ Moynihan raged, ‘find himself giving interviews to the press 
asserting a right to do what the Secretary of State had said was not being done in 
India?’ Half the politicians in India, the ambassador protested, already suspected that 
the CIA was up to no good in South Asia, while the other half were astute enough to 
recognize that by demonizing the Agency, and its purportedly nefarious activities in 
India, they could outflank domestic critics. Colby’s display of candor, Moynihan 
mused, had all but ensured that the CIA would continue to be an unwelcome irritant 
in Indo-US relations. Urging Washington to exercise tighter control on Colby and his 
Agency, Moynihan emphasized to Kissinger that in India: 
…we [the United States] are struggling to survive…Which is to say struggling to 
maintain the belief among a sufficient number of Indians that there is indeed a 
common purpose between our democracies such that at very least we wish India 
well and do not seek to subvert its regime. That such a minimal objective should 
seem in danger. That the day should have arrived when such matters could be 
questioned should in itself suggest the extremity of our situation.45  
 
  
Daniel Moynihan departed from India, in January 1975, in a state of depression. 
Two years previously, the ambassador had been attracted to the subcontinent by the 
formidable challenge of recalibrating the troubled relationship between America and 
India, a land in which, he declared, Asian ‘liberty resides.’ An essential element in 
Moynihan’s plan to reinvigorate Indo-US relations was predicated on quiet 
diplomacy. The United States had, in his estimation, alienated opinion within the 
developing world through a combination of overbearing rhetoric and the pursuit of an 
unnecessarily interventionist foreign policy. ‘I have not overburdened either the 
Indian or American pubic with commentary or advice,’ Moynihan stated proudly on 
the occasion of his last public appearance in India. ‘I have spoken in public only four 
times in two years, and two of these occasions took place a fortnight ago. I have not 
until this moment given a press conference.’ Moynihan was acutely aware, however, 
that his diplomatic taciturnity had been compromised by a poisonous legacy of CIA 
misdemeanours, past and present. ‘Both the United States and India have far closer 
and more cooperative relations with the totalitarian powers of the world, than we have 
with one another,’ a dispirited Moynihan reflected as he prepared to leave New Delhi. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Moynihan to Kissinger, No. 16066, 3 Dec. 1974, Box I-371, Folder India: Central Intelligence 
Agency, DPMP.  
43 Weisman, Portrait in Letters, diary entry 27 Nov. 1974, p. 360. 
44 Weisman, Portrait in Letters, diary entry 28 Oct. 1974, p. 356. 45	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‘Indeed, it is from one another that we are increasingly isolated.’46 
 
 
III 
 
Irksome repercussions, or blowback, from the CIA’s fractious and conflicted 
relationship with India, continued to bedevil Moynihan long after his return to the 
United States. In 1979, the publication of Moynihan’s memoir, A Dangerous Place, 
reignited debates in the subcontinent over the Agency’s purported interference in 
India’s internal affairs. Controversially, Moynihan’s book confirmed that while 
serving as ambassador in New Delhi, he had ordered an enquiry into the history of 
CIA operations in India, the remit of which stretched back over three decades. Having 
resolved to establish ‘just what we [America] had been up to,’ Moynihan claimed that 
the CIA had twice, but only twice, interfered directly in India’s domestic affairs by 
covertly channelling money to political parties. On both occasions, the former 
ambassador revealed, once in the western Indian state of Kerala and once in the 
eastern province of West Bengal, CIA funds had been provided to the Congress party, 
and in one instance to Indira Gandhi herself. Moynihan went on to speculate that the 
CIA’s record of covert political funding may have fuelled Gandhi’s paranoiac attitude 
towards the Agency when, on his watch, ‘we were no longer giving any money to 
her.’ Stark discrepancies between the marginal political benefits reaped in India from 
these intelligence operations, and their considerable longer-term costs, Moynihan 
argued, strongly suggested that this was ‘not a practice to be encouraged.’47 
Back in India, Moynihan’s book met with a furious rebuttal from Gandhi and her 
political supporters. On 20 April 1979, members of the South Calcutta district youth 
congress marched on the US consulate and delivered a letter addressed to US 
president, Jimmy Carter, in which Moynihan was castigated for an ‘ugly’ political 
attack on Gandhi that ‘may ultimately create sever bitterness between the people of 
these two countries.’48 Congress leaders rushed to condemn Moynihan for impugning 
Gandhi’s reputation. Implausibly labelling Moynihan a ‘CIA agent’ and ‘Zionist’ 
bitterly opposed to India’s pro-Arab policies, the Congress party’s parliamentary 
leader called for the US embassy to be closed unless an immediate apology was 
forthcoming from Washington. Prominent titles amongst India’s left-wing tabloid 
press, such as Wave and Blitz, ran banner headlines proclaiming, ‘Moynihan a Zionist, 
Racist Scorpion,’ and, ‘Liar Moynihan’s Accusations are a Cover-Up for Real CIA 
Lobby.’ One indignant Indian citizen, Mohinder Singh, saw fit to file a defamation 
case in the Indian courts against Moynihan on Gandhi’s behalf.49  
Indira Gandhi vigorously denied Moynihan’s charges, disparaging them as 
‘mischievous, malicious and baseless.’ Rallying behind their leader, Congress 
supporters attending a party meeting in the city of Jaipur set fire to pictures of Carter, 
in protest at what they characterised as Moynihan’s complicity in the latest in a long 
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line of American attacks on Indian sovereignty.50 Uncomfortably for Gandhi, India’s 
mainstream media was less inclined to discount Moynihan’s charges. In an editorial 
entitled, ‘A Serious Affair,’ the respected Calcutta daily, The Statesman, insisted that: 
 
…the allegation cannot be dismissed as a casual remark or a bit of political 
gossip…Unless Washington comes out with an official explanation, Indians will 
find it difficult to believe that the practice of financing political parties has really 
ended. Instead, there will be increasing cynicism about democratic procedures and 
the role of alleged foreign friends.51 
 
Meeting with Indian press correspondents in Washington towards the end of April, 
Moynihan robustly defended A Dangerous Place. Addressing the statements that he 
had made concerning CIA support for Indian political parties, Moynihan stated that, 
‘what we [the United States] did was perfectly legitimate according to the standards 
of the time… today I would say “don’t do it.”’ ‘Looking back,’ he added, ‘obviously 
that [CIA activity in India] caused us trouble. There was constant and incessant 
insinuation of some massive activity on our part which never existed…’52 
The climax of the Dangerous Place affair played out on the evening of 7 May 
during the course of a stormy four-hour debate held in the Lok Sabha, India’s lower 
house of parliament. In a turbulent session, Congress MP’s heaped abuse on 
Moynihan, while opponents of Gandhi pressed the Indian government to appoint a 
commission of inquiry into alleged CIA funding of political parties. Observing events 
from inside the parliamentary chamber, American diplomats looked on in horror as 
Indian politicians launched a series of ‘histrionic, vitriolic attacks on Sen. Moynihan 
[and] the CIA…’ The debate concluded with India’s embattled Home Minister 
assuring exercised colleagues that his government would take action to address 
irregularities in the funding of political parties and, ‘try to plug as many loopholes as 
possible to stop the influx of illegal foreign money.’ In an attempt to stop the fallout 
from Moynihan’s book spiralling out of control, both the US embassy in New Delhi 
and the state department back in Washington declined all invitations from Indian 
journalists to comment on Moynihan’s disclosures. In the India’s cities meanwhile, 
crowds seized copies of A Dangerous Place from bookshops and burned them in the 
streets alongside effigies of the reviled Moynihan.53  
 
IV 
 
Orthodox accounts of Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s long political career locate his 
emergence as a prominent critic of the CIA in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the 
Cold War stuttered to a close. Moynihan developed his critique of the intelligence 
bureaucracy, so the story goes, while serving inside the Federal government, first as 
Senator for New York and, latterly, as a member of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence. In April 1984, Moynihan garnered national news headlines by 
temporarily standing down as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee in 	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protest at the CIA’s failure to ‘properly’ consult Congress on the mining of 
Nicaraguan harbours.54  A subsequent apology from CIA Director, William Casey, 
saw Moynihan resume his post, although relations between the Senator and the 
Agency remained uneasy. Prior to this, Moynihan had openly disparaged inflated CIA 
estimates of Soviet power, dismissing as nonsense dire warnings from Langley that 
the United States risked being left behind by Moscow’s planned economy.55  
Celebrated as ‘the quintessential liberal anti-Communist,’ Moynihan was 
especially well qualified to challenge the institutional guardians of America’s secret 
intelligence community.56  In May 1991, in an op-ed article written for New York 
Times, Moynihan announced his intention to place a bill before Congress calling for 
the abolition of the CIA, and the transferal of the Agency’s intelligence functions to 
the state department.57 Moynihan renewed his call for the Agency to be scrapped four 
year later, in early 1995. “Secrecy is a disease,’ he asserted. ‘It causes hardening of 
the arteries of the mind. It hinders true scholarship and hides mistakes…The State 
Department must function as the primary agency in formulating and conducting 
foreign policy. Any other arrangement invited confusion.’58 Such radical prescriptions 
for intelligence reform, however, unnerved more conservative legislators, and 
Moynihan’s bills were never put to a vote. 
Contemporaneous claims made by the CIA that the Agency was shedding a Cold 
War mentality predicated on extreme secrecy, and embracing a new model of 
transparency and accountability, were received with scepticism by Moynihan. In 
February 1992, CIA director, Robert Gates, gave a public address on the subject of 
‘CIA Openness.’ Acknowledging that many journalists in the audience would 
interpret the subject of his speech as ‘oxymoronic, like bureaucratic efficiency,’ Gates 
nevertheless committed the CIA to, ‘a real shift…toward greater openness and a sense 
of public responsibility.’ Moynihan was not alone in reacting to Gates’ initiative with 
a measure cynicism. Senator Alan Cranston, a Democrat from California, observed 
that he had, ‘seen too many [CIA] documents classified that shouldn't be.’ ‘I'd like to 
talk with Gates,’ Cranston proclaimed, ‘and spur him on to explore what further can 
be done.’ Gates planned to inject substance into his rhetoric through the creation of a 
CIA ‘Openness Task Force.’ Comically, the CIA’s commitment to transparency 
floundered when the Task Force’s first report was classified, and screened from 
public scrutiny.59 Responding from the floor of the Senate, an exasperated Moynihan 
proclaimed that, ‘the secrecy system is out of control because it has no means to 
correct itself.’60   
Moynihan went on to chair a bipartisan commission on protecting and reducing 
government secrecy that, between January 1995 and December 1996, conducted a 
wide-ranging review of the US intelligence community and its relationship with 
America’s citizens. The commission’s core findings, which appeared early in 1997, 	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were brought to a wider public audience the following year with the publication of 
Moynihan’s book, Secrecy: The American Experience. In Secrecy, Moynihan 
presented a characteristically sweeping and urbane analysis of the evolution of 
American secret intelligence, from the onset of the First World War to the end of the 
Cold War, and beyond. Singling out the CIA for particular censure, Moynihan 
depicted the Agency as an information-gathering organization that had lost its way 
and succumbed to the lure of audacious, but invariably disastrous, covert operations. 
A conspiracy of secrecy ensued between CIA directors intent on preserving the 
Agency’s bureaucratic power, and US presidents minded to pursue foreign policies 
free from domestic or international legal constraints.  
It is within the pages of Secrecy, that we are reminded, almost as an aside, that the 
genesis of Moynihan’s interest in the linkages between intelligence operations, 
secrecy and diplomacy were first distilled not in the cool, marble chambers of Capitol 
Hill, but in the fierce political heat of India.61 The two years that Moynihan spent in 
New Delhi as US ambassador, between 1973 and 1975, undoubtedly played a crucial 
part in shaping the attitudes, actions and utterances in relation to the CIA that 
dominated the twilight of his political career. In March 1975, within months of 
leaving India, the searing impact of dealing with endless CIA scandals in the 
subcontinent, real and imagined, were clearly evident in Moynihan’s thinking on 
matters of intelligence. Writing in Commentary magazine, Moynihan made the case 
for placing less reliance of the dubious merits of secret operations, and more emphasis 
on engaging in open and honest dialogue with the United States’ global partners. 
Anticipating the Indian furore that accompanied the appearance of A Dangerous 
Place, America’s representatives abroad, Moynihan argued pointedly, ‘should come 
to be feared in international forums for the truths he might tell.’62  
Today, events in South Asia have thrown up familiar questions surrounding the 
extent to which the CIA has functioned as the US executive’s private army, absent 
from appropriate legislative scrutiny. In prosecuting a so-called ‘War on Terror,’ 
centred in the Indian subcontinent, the CIA, we are reminded, has engaged in 
assassination, kidnapping, extrajudicial detention and torture. Had the US Congress or 
the American people openly debated these actions, it is unlikely they would have been 
approved. Without doubt, such actions have the eroded the legitimacy of American 
foreign policy. Salutary lessons on the interrelationships between intelligence, secrecy 
and diplomacy that Daniel Patrick Moynihan absorbed during his time in South Asia, 
it seems, remain as pertinent today in the midst of our century’s first global war, as 
they did over two decades ago, at the conclusion of another.  
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